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Abstract— In a variety of applications, there is a need to
authenticate content that has experienced legitimate editing in
addition to potential tampering attacks. We develop one formu-
lation of this problem based on a strict notion of security, and
characterize and interpret the associated information-theoretic
performance limits. The results can be viewed as a natural
generalization of classical approaches to traditional authentica-
tion. Additional insights into the structure of such systems and
their behavior are obtained by further specializing the results to
Bernoulli and Gaussian cases. The associated systems are shown
to be substantially better in terms of performance and/or security
than commonly advocated approaches based on data hiding and
digital watermarking. Finally, the formulation is extended to
obtain efficient layered authentication system constructions.
Index Terms— coding with side information, data hiding,
digital signatures, digital watermarking, information embedding,
joint source-channel coding, multimedia security, robust hashing,
tamper-proofing, transaction-tracking
I. INTRODUCTION
IN traditional authentication problems, the goal is to de-termine whether some content being examined is an exact
replica of what was created by the author. Digital signature
techniques [1] are a natural tool for addressing such prob-
lems. In such formulations, the focus on exactness avoids
consideration of semantic issues. However, in many emerging
applications, semantic issues are an integral aspect of the
problem, and cannot be treated separably. As contemporary
examples, the content of interest may be an audio or video
waveform, or an image, and before being presented to a
decoder the waveform may experience any of a variety of
possible perturbations, including, for example, degradation
due to noise or compression; transformation by filtering,
resampling, or transcoding; or editing to annotate, enhance, or
otherwise modify the waveform. Moreover, such perturbations
may be intentional or unintentional, benign or malicious, and
semantically significant or not. Methods for reliable authenti-
cation from such perturbed data are important as well.
The spectrum of applications where such authentication
capabilities will be important is enormous, ranging from
drivers’ licenses, passports, and other government-issued photo
identication; to news photographs and interview tapes; to
state-issued currency and other monetary instruments; to legal
evidence in the form of audio and video recordings in court
cases. Indeed, the rapidly increasing ease with which such
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content can be digitally manipulated in sophisticated ways us-
ing inexpensive systems, whether for legitimate or fraudulent
purposes, is of considerable concern in these applications.
Arising out of such concerns, a variety of technologies have
been introduced to facilitate authentication in such settings.
Examples include various physical watermarking technologies
— such as hologram imprinting in images — as well as more
recent digital decendents. See, e.g., [2] for some of the rich
history in this area going back several hundred years. However,
regardless of the implementation, all involve the process of
marking or altering the content in some way, which can be
viewed as a form of encoding.
A rather generic problem that encompasses essentially all
the applications of interest is that of transaction-tracking
in a content migration scenario. In this scenario, there are
essentially three types of participants involved in the migration
of a particular piece of content. There is the original author
or creator of the content, who delivers an encoding of it.1
There is the editor who makes modifications to this encoded
content, and publishes the result.2 And there is the reader
or end-user for whom the published work is intended. The
reader wants to be able to determine 1) whether published
work being examined was derived from content originally
generated by the author, and 2) how it was modified by the
editor. At the same time, the editor wants the author’s encoding
to be (semantically) close to the original content, so that the
modifications can take the semantics into account as necessary.
In the recent literature, researchers have proposed a vari-
ety of approaches to such problems based on elements of
digital watermarking, cryptography, and content classification;
see, e.g., [3]–[18] and the references therein. Ultimately, the
methods developed to date implicitly or explicitly attempt
to balance the competing goals of robustness to benign per-
turbations, security against tampering attacks, and encoding
distortion.
Within this literature, there are two basic types of ap-
proaches. In the first, the authentication mechanism is based
on embedding what is referred to as a “fragile” watermark
known to both encoder and decoder into the content of interest.
At the decoder, a watermark is extracted and compared to
the known watermark inserted by the encoder. The difference
between the extracted watermark and the known watermark is
then interpreted as a measure of authenticity. Examples of this
basic approach include [5], [7], [13], [14].
1There are no inherent restrictions on what can constitute “content” in this
generic problem. Typical examples include video, audio, imagery, text, and
various kinds data.
2The motives and behavior of the editor naturally depend on the particular
application and situation. At one extreme the editor might just perform some
benign resampling or other transcoding, or, at the other extreme, might attempt
to create a forgery from the content. In the latter case, the editor would be
considered an attacker.
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The second type of approach is based on a “robust” wa-
termarking strategy, whereby the important features of the
content are extracted, compressed and embedded back into
the content by the encoder. The decoder attempts to extract
the watermark from the content it obtains and authenticates
by comparing the features encoded in the watermark to the
features in the content itself. This strategy is sometimes termed
“self-embedding.” Examples of this basic approach include
[4], [11], [15].
Despite the growing number of proposed systems, many
basic questions remain about 1) how to best model the problem
and what we mean by authentication, 2) what the associated
fundamental performance limits are, and 3) what system struc-
tures can and cannot approach those limits. More generally,
there are basic questions about the degree to which the
authentication, digital watermarking, and data hiding problems
are related or not.
While information-theoretic treatments of authentication
problems are just emerging, there has been a growing literature
in the information theory community on digital watermarking
and data hiding problems, and more generally problems of
coding with side information, much of which builds on the
foundation of [19]–[21]; see, e.g., [22]–[42] and the references
therein. Collectively, this work provides a useful context within
which to examine the topic of authentication.
Our contribution in this paper is to propose one possible
formulation for the general problem of authentication with a
semantic model, and examine its implications. In particular,
using distortion criteria to capture semantic aspects of the
problem, we assess performance limits in terms of the inherent
trade-offs between security, robustness, and distortion, and in
turn develop the structure of systems that make these trade-
offs efficiently. As we will show, these systems have important
distinguishing characteristics from those proposed to date. We
also see that under this model, the general authentication
problem is substantially different from familiar formulations
of the digital watermarking and data hiding problems, and has
a correspondingly different solution.
A detailed outline of the paper is as follows. We begin by
briefly defining our notation and terminology in Section II.
Next in Section III, we develop a system model and prob-
lem formulation, quantifying a notion of authentication. In
Section IV, we characterize the performance limits of such
systems via our main coding theorem. Section V contains
both the associated achievability proof, which identifies the
structure of good systems, and a converse. In Section VI the
results are applied to the case of binary content with Hamming
distortion measures, and in Section VII to Gaussian content
with quadratic distortion measures. Section VIII then analyzes
other classes of authentication techniques in the context of
our framework, and shows that they are inherently either less
efficient or less secure that the systems developed here. Next,
Section IX generalizes the results of the paper to include
layered systems that support multiple levels of authentication.
Finally, Section X contains some concluding remarks.
II. NOTATION AND TERMINOLOGY
We use standard information theory notation (e.g., as found
in [43]). Specifically, E[A] denotes expectation of the random
variable A, H(A), and I(B;C) denote entropy and mutual
information, and A↔ B ↔ C denotes the Markov condition
that random variables A and C are independent given B. We
use the notation vji to denote the sequence {vi, vi+1, . . . , vj},
and define vn = vn1 . Alphabets are denoted by uppercase
calligraphic letters, e.g., S, X. We use |·| to denote the
cardinality of a set or alphabet.
Since the applications are quite varied, we keep our ter-
minology rather generic. The content of interest, as well as
its various encodings and recontructions, will be generically
referred to as “signals,” regardless of whether they refer to
video, audio, imagery, text, data, or any other kind of content.
The original content we will also sometimes simply refer
to as the “source.” Moreover, we will generally associate
any manipulations of the encoded content with the “editor,”
regardless of whether any human is involved. However, as an
exception, we will often use the term “attacker” in lieu of
“editor” for cases where the manipulations are specifically of
a malicious nature.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Our system model for the transaction-tracking scenario
is as depicted in Fig. 1. To simplify the exposition, we
model the original content as an independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.)3 sequence S1, S2, . . . , Sn. In practice Sn
could correspond to sample values or signal representations in
some suitable basis.
The encoder takes as input the block of n source samples
Sn, producing an output Xn that is suitably close to Sn
with respect to some distortion measure. The encoder is under
the control of the content creator. The encoded signal then
passes through a channel, which models the actions of the
generic “editor”, and encompasses all processing experienced
by the encoded signal before it is made available to the end-
user as Y n. This processing would include all effects ranging
from routine handling to malicious tampering. The decoder,
which is controlled by the end-user, either produces, to within
some fidelity as quantified by a suitable distortion measure, a
reconstruction Sˆn of the source that is guaranteed to be free
from the effects of any modifications by the editor, or declares
that it is not possible to produce such a reconstruction. We
term such reconstructions “authentic.”
Our approach to the associated channel modeling issues in
the formulation of Fig. 1 has some novel features, and thus
warrants special discussion. Indeed, as we now discuss, our
approach to such modeling is not to anticipate the possible
behaviors of the editor, but to effectively constrain them. In
particular, we avoid choosing a model that tries to characterize
the range of processing the editor might undertake. If we did,
3Our results do not depend critically on the i.i.d. property, which is chosen
for convenience. In fact, the i.i.d. model is sometimes pessimistic; better
performance can often be obtained by taking advantage of correlation present
in the source or channel. We believe that qualitatively similar results would
be obtained in more general settings (e.g., using techniques from [44], [45]).
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Fig. 1. Authentication system model. The source Sn is encoded by the content creator into Xn, incurring some distortion. The channel models the actions of
the editor, i.e., all processing experienced by the encoded content before it is made available to the end-user. The decoder, controlled by the end-user, produces
from the channel output Y n either an authentic reconstruction Sˆn of the source to within some fidelity, or indicates that authentication is not possible using
the special symbol ∅.
the security properties of the resulting system would end up
being sensitive to any modeling errors, i.e., to any behavior of
the editor that is inconsistent with the model.
Instead, the focus is on choosing a model that defines
the range of processing the editor can undertake and have
such edits accepted by the end-user. We refer to this as our
“reference channel model.” Specifically, we effectively design
the system such the decoder will successfully authenticate
the modified content if and only if the edits are consistent
with the reference channel model. Thus, the editor is free
to edit the content in any way (and we make no attempt to
model the range of behavior), but the subset of behaviors for
which the system will authenticate is strictly controlled via
the reference channel construct. Ultimately, since the end-user
will not accept content that cannot be authenticated, the editor
will constrain its behavior according to the reference channel.
From this perspective, the reference channel model is a
system design parameter, and thus is known a priori to
encoders, decoders, and editors. To simplify our analysis, we
will restrict our attention to memoryless probabilistic reference
channel models. In this case, the model is characterized by a
simple conditional distribution p(Y |X).
As our main result, in Section IV we characterize when
authentication systems with the above-described behavior are
possible, and when they are not. Specifically, let De denote
the encoding distortion, i.e., the distortion experienced in the
absence of a channel, and let Dr denote the distortion in the
reconstruction produced by the decoder when the signal can be
authenticated, i.e., when the channel transformations are con-
sistent with the chosen reference distribution p(y|x). Then we
determine which distortion pairs (De, Dr) are asymptotically
achievable.
We emphasize that the distortion pair (De, Dr) corresponds
precisely to the performance characteristics of direct interest
in the system for the transaction-tracking scenario. Indeed,
a small De means the editor is given work with a faithful
version of the original content. Moreover, a small Dr means
that the end-user is able to accurately estimate the editor’s
modifications by comparing the decoder input to the authentic
reconstruction.
A. Defining “Authenticity”
To develop our main results, we first need to quantify
the concept of an “authentic reconstruction.” Recall that our
intuitive notion of an authentic reconstruction is one that is
free from the effects of the edits when the reference channel
is in effect. Formally, this is naturally expressed as follows.
Definition 1: A reconstruction Sˆn produced by the decoder
from the output Y n of the reference channel is said to be
authentic if it satisfies the Markov condition below:
Sˆn ↔ {Sn, Xn} ↔ Y n (1)
Note that as special cases, this definition would include
systems in which, for example, Sˆn is a deterministic or
randomized function of Sn. More generally, this definition
means that the authentic reconstructions are effectively defined
by the encoder in such systems. This will have implications
later in the system design.
B. An Example Distortion Region
Before developing our main result, we illustrate with an
example the kinds of results that will be obtained. This exam-
ple corresponds to a problem involving a symmetric Bernoulli
source, Hamming distortion measures, and a (memoryless)
binary symmetric reference channel with crossover probability
p.
Under this example scenario, the editor is allowed to flip a
fraction p of the binary source samples, and the end-user must
(almost certainly) be able to generate an authentic reconstruc-
tion from such a perturbation. If the edits are generated from
a different distribution, such as a binary symmetric channel
with a cross-over probability greater than p, then the decoder
must (almost certainly) declare an authentication failure.
The corresponding achievable distortion region is depicted
in Fig. 2. Several points on the frontier are worth discussing.
First, note that the upper left point on the frontier, i.e.,
(De, Dr) = (0, 1/2), reflects that if no encoding distortion
is allowed, then authentic reconstructions are not possible,
since the maximum possible distortion is incurred. At the other
extreme, the lower right point of the frontier, i.e., (De, Dr) =
(1/2, p), corresponds to a system in which the source is first
source coded to distortion p, afterwhich the resulting bits are
digitally signed and channel coded for the BSC.
While no amount of encoding distortion can reduce the
reconstruction distortion below p, the point (De, Dr) = (p, p)
on the frontier establishes that a reconstruction distortion of p
is actually achievable with much less encoding distortion than
the lower right point suggests. In fact, because the required
encoding distortion is only p, the decoder can be viewed as
completely eliminating the effects of the reference channel
when it is in effect: the minimum achievable reconstruction
distortion Dr is the same as the distortion De at the output of
the encoder.
The more general structure of the frontier is also worth
observing. In particular, Dr is a decreasing function of De
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Fig. 2. The shaded area depicts the achievable distortion region for a
symmetric Bernoulli source used in conjunction with a binary symmetric
reference channel of crossover probability p. Distortions are with respect to
the Hamming measure. The case p = 0 corresponds to traditional digital
signatures. If authentication was not required, the point (De = 0, Dr = p)
could be achieved.
along the frontier. This reflects that the objectives of small De
(which the editor wants) and a small Dr (which the end-user
wants) are conflicting and a fundamental tradeoff is involved
for any given reference channel. In fact, as we will see in the
sequel, this behavior is not specific to this example, but a more
general feature of our authentication problem formulation.4
Finally, observe that the achievable region decreases mono-
tonically with p, the severity of edits allowed. Thus, if one
has particular target encoding and reconstruction distortions,
then this effectively limits how much editing can be tolerated.
As the extreme point, the case p = 0 in which no editing
is allowed corresponds to the traditional scenario for digital
signatures. In this case, as the figure reflects, authentication
is achievable without incurring any encoding distortion nor
reconstruction distortion. It is worth noting that the nature of
the interplay between the severity of the reference channel
and the achievable distortion region is not specific to this
example, but arises more generally with this formulation of
the authentication problem.
IV. CHARACTERIZATION OF SOLUTION: CODING
THEOREMS
An instance of the authentication problem consists of the
seven-tuple
{S, p(s),X,Y, p(y|x), de(·, ·), dr(·, ·)} . (2)
We use S to denote the source alphabet—which is finite unless
otherwise indicated—and p(s) is its (i.i.d.) distribution. The
4This should not be surprising, since such tradeoffs frequently arise in joint
source-channel coding problems with uncertain channels; see, e.g., [46]–[48].
channel input and output alphabets are X and Y and p(y|x)
is the (memoryless) reference channel law. Finally, de(·, ·)
and dr(·, ·) are the encoding and reconstruction distortion
measures.
A solution to this problem (i.e., an authentication scheme)
consists of an algorithm that returns an encoding function
Υn, a decoding function Φn, and a secret key θ. The secret
key is shared only between the encoder and decoder; all
other information is known to all parties including editors.
(For the interested reader, straightforward adaptations of our
solutions to public-key implementations are summarized in
the Appendix. However, we otherwise restrict our attention
to private-key schemes in the paper to focus the exposition.)
The secret key θ is a k-bit sequence with k sufficiently large.
The encoder is a mapping from the source sequence and the
secret key to codewords, i.e.,
Υn(S
n, θ) : Sn × {0, 1}k 7→ Xn.
The decoder is a mapping from the channel output and the
secret key to either an authentic source reconstruction Sˆn (i.e.,
one satisfying (1)) or the special symbol ∅ that indicates such
a reconstruction is not possible; whence,
Φn (Y
n, θ) : Yn × {0, 1}k 7→ Sn ∪ {∅}.
Notice that since an authentic reconstruction must satisfy (1),
and since the decoder must satisfy the Markov condition
{Sn, Xn} ↔ Y n ↔ Φn (Y n, θ), we have that Sˆn ↔
{Sn, Xn} ↔ Φn (Y n, θ) forms a Markov chain only when
successful decoding occurs. Thus, the authentic reconstruction
Sˆn should be defined as a quantity that the decoder attempts
to deduce since defining Sˆn = Φn (Y, θn) will generally not
satisfy (1).
Henceforth, except when there is risk of confusion, we omit
both the subscript n and the secret key argument from the
encoding and decoding function notation, letting the depen-
dence be implicit. Moreover, when the encoder and/or decoder
are randomized functions, then all probabilities are taken over
these randomizations as well as the source and channel law.
The relevant distortions are the encoding and decoding
distortion computed as the sum of the respective (bounded)
single letter distortion functions de and dr, i.e.,
1
n
n∑
i=1
de(Si, Xi) and
1
n
n∑
i=1
dr(Si,Φi (Y
n)).
Evidently,
de : S× X 7→ R+ (3)
dr : S× S 7→ R+. (4)
The system can fail in one of three ways. The first two
failure modes correspond to either the encoder introducing
excessive encoding distortion, or the decoder failing to produce
an authentic reconstruction with acceptable distortion when
the reference channel is in effect. Accordingly, we define the
overall distortion violation error event to be
Edv = EDe ∪ EDr (5)
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where, for any ǫ > 0,
EDe =
{
1
n
n∑
i=1
de(Si, Xi) > De + ǫ
}
(6)
EDr =
{
Φn (Y
n) = ∅
}
∪
{
1
n
n∑
i=1
dr(Si,Φi (Y
n)) > Dr + ǫ
}
∩
{
Φn (Y
n) 6= ∅
}
. (7)
In the remaining failure mode, the system fails to produce
the desired authentic reconstruction Sˆn from the channel
output and instead of declaring that authentication is not
possible produces an incorrect estimate. Specifically, we define
the successful attack event according to
Esa = {Φ (Y n) 6= ∅} ∩ {Φ (Y n) 6= Sˆn}. (8)
Definition 2: The achievable distortion region for the prob-
lem (2) is the closure of the set of pairs (De, Dr) such that
there exists a sequence of authentication systems, indexed by
n, where for every ǫ > 0 and as n → ∞, Pr[Esa] → 0
regardless of the channel law in effect, Pr[EDe ] → 0, and
Pr[EDr ] → 0 when the reference channel is in effect, with
Esa, EDe , and EDr as defined in (8), (6), and (7).
For such systems, we have the following coding theorem:
Theorem 1: The distortion pair (De, Dr) lies in the achiev-
able distortion region for the problem (2) if and only
if there exist functions f(·, ·), g(·) and a distribution
p(y, x, u, s) = p(s)p(u|s)p(x|u, s)p(y|x) with X determin-
istic (i.e. p(x|u, s) = 1x=f(s,u)) such that
I(U ;Y )− I(S;U) ≥ 0 (9a)
E[de(S, f(U, S))] ≤ De (9b)
E[dr(S, g(U))] ≤ Dr. (9c)
The alphabet U of the auxiliary random variable U requires
cardinality |U| ≤ (|S|+ |X|+ 3) · |S| · |X|.5
Essentially, the auxiliary random variable U represents an
embedded description of the source that can be authenticated,
X represents the encoding of the source S, and g(U) in (9c)
represents the authentic reconstruction. The usual condition
that the channel output is determined from the channel input
(i.e., the encoder does not know what the channel output will
be until after the channel input is fixed) is captured by the
requirement that the full joint distribution p(y, x, u, s) factors
as shown above. The requirement (1) that the authentic recon-
struction does not depend directly on the editors manipulations
— i.e., the realization of the reference channel — is captured
by the fact that g(·) depends only on U and not on Y . Without
the authentication requirement, the set of achievable distortion
pairs can be enlarged by allowing the reconstruction to depend
on the channel output, i.e. g(U) in (9c) can be replaced by
g(U, Y ). Thus, as we shall see in Sections VI and VII, security
comes at a price in this problem.
5If instead f(U, S) is allowed to be a non-deterministic mapping, then it
is sufficient to consider distributions where the auxiliary random variable has
the smaller alphabet |U| ≤ |S|+ |X|+ 3.
Theorem 1 has some interesting features. First, it is worth
noting that since the problem formulation is inherently “ana-
log,” dealing only with waveforms, we might expect the best
solutions to the problem to be analog in nature. However,
what the theorem suggests, and what its proof confirms, is that
digital solutions are in fact sufficient to achieve optimality. In
particular, as we will see, source and channel coding based
on discrete codebooks are key ingredients of the achievability
argument. In some sense, this is the consequence of the inher-
ently discrete functionality we have required of the decoder
with our formulation.
As a second remark, note that Theorem 1 can be con-
trasted with its information embedding counterpart, which
as generalized from [19] in [36], states that a pair (R,De),
where R is the embedding rate, is achievable if and
only if there exists a function f(·, ·) and a distribution
p(y, x, u, s) = p(s)p(u|s)p(x|s, u)p(y|x) with X determin-
istic (i.e. p(x|u, s) = 1x=f(s,u)) such that
I(U ;Y )− I(S;U) ≥ R (10a)
E[de(S, f(U, S))] ≤ De. (10b)
Thus we see that the authentication problem is substantially
different from the information embedding problem.
Before developing the proofs of Theorem 1, to develop
intuition we describe the general system structure, and its
specialization to the Gaussian-quadratic case.
A. General System Structure
As developed in detail in Section V, an optimal authentica-
tion system can be constructed by choosing a codebook C with
codewords appropriately distributed over the space of possible
source outcomes. The elements of a randomly chosen subset
of these codewords A ⊂ C are marked as admissible and the
knowledge of A is a secret shared between the encoder and
decoder, and kept from editors.
The encoder maps (quantizes) the source Sn to the nearest
admissible codeword Un and then generates the channel input
Xn from Un. The decoder maps the signal it obtains to the
nearest codeword Cn ∈ C. If Cn ∈ A, i.e., Cn is an admissible
codeword, the decoder produces the reconstruction Sˆn from
Cn. If Cn 6∈ A, i.e., Cn is not admissible, the decoder declares
that an authentic reconstruction is not possible.
Observe that the A must have the following three char-
acteristics. First, to avoid a successful attack the number of
admissible codewords must be appropriately small. Indeed,
since attackers do not know A, if an attacker’s tampering
causes the decoder to decode to any codeword other than
Un then the probability that the decoder is fooled by the
tampering and does not declare a decoding failure is bounded
by |A| / |C|. Second, to avoid an encoding distortion violation,
the set of admissible codewords should be dense enough to
allow the encoder to find an appropriate Xn near Sn. Third, to
avoid a reconstruction distortion violation, the decoder should
be able to distinguish the possible encoded signals at the
output of the reference channel. Thus the codewords should be
sufficiently separated that they can be resolved at the output
of the reference channel.
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1) Geometry for Gaussian-Quadratic Example: We illus-
trate the system geometry in the case of a white Gaussian
source, quadratic distortion measure, and an additive white
Gaussian noise reference channel, in the high signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) regime. We let σ2S and σ2N denote the source
and channel variances, respectively. For this example, we can
construct C by packing codewords into the space of possible
source vectors such that no codeword is closer than some
distance r
√
n to any other, i.e., packing spheres of radius
r
√
n into a sphere of radius σS
√
n where the center of the
spheres correspond to codewords. Next, a fraction 2−nγ of
the codewords in C are chosen at random and marked as
admissible to form A. It suffices to let γ = 1/
√
n and
r2 = σ2N + ǫ for some ǫ > 0 that is arbitrarily small. This
construction is illustrated in Fig. 3.
The encoder maps the source Sn to a nearby admissible
codeword Un, which it chooses as the encoding Xn. Since
the number of admissible codewords in a sphere of radius d
centered on Sn is roughly
|A|
|C| ·
(
d
r
)n
,
on average there exists at least one codeword within distance
d of the source provided d ≥ r2γ . Thus, the average encoding
distortion is roughly r222γ , which approaches σ2N + ǫ as n→
∞.
The authentic reconstruction is Sˆn = Un. Thus, when the
decoder correctly identifies Un, the reconstruction distortion
is the same as the encoding distortion. And when the reference
channel is in effect, the decoder does indeed correctly identify
Un. This follows from the fact that with high probability, the
reference channel noise creates a perturbation within a noise
sphere of radius σN
√
n about the encoding Xn, and the noise
spheres do not intersect since r > σN .
Furthermore, when the reference channel is not in effect
and an attacker tampers with the signal such that the nearest
codeword C is different from that chosen by the encoder Un,
then the probability that C was marked as admissible in the
codebook construction phase is
Pr[C ∈ A|C 6= Un] = |A||C| = 2
−nγ ,
which goes to zero as n→∞. The decoder generates ∅ if it
decodes to a non-admissible codeword, so the probability of
a nonauthentic reconstruction is vanishingly small.
Thus the distortions De = Dr = σ2N can be approached
with an arbitrarily small probability of successful attack. See
[49], [50] for insights into the practical implementation of this
class of systems including those designed based on a public
key instead of a secret key.
V. PROOFS
A. Forward Part: Sufficiency
Here we show that if there exist distributions and functions
satisfying (9), then for every ǫ > 0 there exists a sequence of
authentication system with distortion at most (De + ǫ,Dr +
ǫ). Since the achievable distortion region is a closed set this
implies that (De, Dr) lies in the achievable distortion region.
We prove this forward part of Theorem 1 by showing the
existence of a random code with the desired properties.
1) Codebook Generation: We begin by choosing some γ >
0 such that
I(Y ;U)− I(U ;S) > 3γ. (11)
where γ decays to zero more slowly than 1/n, i.e.,
γ → 0 and nγ →∞ as n→∞. (12)
Given the choice of γ, the encoder chooses a random codebook
C of rate
R = I(S;U) + 2γ. (13)
Each codeword in C is a sequence of 2nR i.i.d. random
variables selected according to the distribution p(u) =∑
s∈S p(u|s)p(s). Then, for each realized codebook C the
encoder randomly marks 2n(R−γ) of the codewords in C as
admissible and the others as forbidden. We denote this new
codebook of admissible codewords as A, which has effective
rate
R′ = R− γ = I(S;U) + γ, (14)
where the last equality follows from substituting (13). The
knowledge of which codewords are forbidden is the secret
key and is revealed only to the decoder. The codebook C is
publicly revealed.
2) Encoding and Decoding: The encoder first tries to find
an admissible codeword un ∈ A that is δ-strongly jointly
typical with its source sequence Sn according to p(u|s). If
the codeword un ∈ A is found to be typical, the encoder
output is produced by mapping the pair (sn, un) into xn via
x = f(s, u). If no jointly typical admissible codeword exists,
the encoder expects the system to fail, and thus selects an
arbitrary codeword.
The decoder attempts to produce the authentic reconstruc-
tion sˆn = gn(un) where
gn(un) = (g(u1), g(u2), . . . , g(un)). (15)
The decoder Φ (·) tries to deduce sˆn by searching for a unique
admissible codeword uˆn ∈ A that is δ-strongly jointly typical
with the obtained sequence Y n. If such a codeword is found
the reconstruction produced is gn(uˆn). If no such unique
codeword is found, the decoder produces the output symbol
∅.
3) System Failure Probabilities: We begin by analyzing the
system failure probabilities.
a) Probability of Successful Attack.: Suppose the at-
tacker causes the codeword obtained by the decoder to be
jointly typical with a unique codeword cn ∈ C. Since the
attacker has no knowledge of which codewords are admissible,
the probability that codeword cn was chosen as admissible in
the codebook construction phase is
Pr[cn ∈ A] = |A||C| =
2nR
′
2nR
= 2−nγ .
where we have used (14) and (13). Therefore,
Pr[Esa] ≤ Pr[Φ (Y n) 6= ∅ | Φ (Y n) 6= Sˆn] = 2−nγ .
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Fig. 3. Codebook construction for the Gaussian-quadratic scenario. The large sphere represents the space of possible source vectors and the small spheres
representing the noise are centered on codewords. When the small spheres do not overlap, the codewords can be resolved at the output of the reference
channel. The shaded spheres represent the admissible codewords—a secret known only to the encoder and decoder.
which goes to zero according to (12). Note that this argument
applies regardless of the method used by the attacker since
without access to the secret key its actions are statistically
independent of which codewords are admissible.
b) Probability of Distortion Violation.: The distortion
violation events EDe and EDr defined in (6) and (7) can arise
due to any of the following typicality failure events:
• Est: The source is not typical.
• Eet: The encoder fails to find an admissible codeword
that is jointly typical with its input.
• Ect: The channel fails to produce an output jointly typical
with its input when the reference channel law is in effect.
• Edt: The decoder fails to find a codeword jointly typical
with its input when the reference channel law is in effect.
A distortion violation event can also occur if there is no
typicality failure but the distortion is still too high. Letting
Etf = Est ∪ Eet ∪ Ect ∪ Edt (16)
denote the typicality failure event, we have then that the
probability of a distortion violation can be expressed as
Pr[Edv] = Pr[Edv | Etf ] · Pr[Etf ] + Pr[Edv | Ectf ] · Pr[Ectf ]
≤ Pr[Edv | Ectf ] + Pr[Etf ]
= Pr [Edv | Ectf ] + Pr[Est] + Pr[Eet | Ecst]
+ Pr[Ect | Ecst,Ecet] + Pr[Edt | Ecst,Ecet,Ecct]. (17)
First, according to well-known properties of typical se-
quences [43], by choosing n large enough we can make
Pr[Est] ≤ ǫ/4 (18)
Pr[Ect | Ecst,Ecet] ≤ ǫ/4. (19)
Second, provided that the source is typical, the probability
that the encoder fails to find a sequence un ∈ A jointly typical
with the source follows from (14) as
Pr[Eet | Ecst] ≤ 2−n[R
′−I(S;U)] = 2−nγ (20)
from standard joint typicality arguments.
Third,
Pr[Edt | Ecst,Ecet,Ecct] ≤ 2−nγ + ǫ/4. (21)
Indeed, using standard joint typicality results, the probability
that the sequence Y n presented to the decoder is not δ-strongly
jointly typical with the correct codeword Un selected by the
encoder can be made smaller than ǫ/4 for n large enough,
and the probability of it being strongly jointly typical with
any other admissible codeword is, using (11) with (13), at
most
2−n[I(U ;Y )−R] ≤ 2−nγ .
Fourth,
Pr [Edv | Ectf ] = 0. (22)
Indeed, provided there are no typicality failures, the pair
(Sn, Y n) must be strongly jointly typical, so by the standard
properties of strong joint typicality,
1
n
n∑
i=1
de(Si, Xi) ≤ E[de(S,X)] + δ · d¯1
1
n
n∑
i=1
dr(Si, gi(Ui)) ≤ E[dr(S, g(U))] + δ · d¯2,
where d¯1 and d¯2 are bounds defined via
d¯1 = sup
(s,x)∈S×X
de(s, x) (23)
d¯2 = sup
(s,sˆ)∈S×S
dr(s, sˆ). (24)
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Thus, choosing δ such that
δ < max
(
ǫ
d¯1
,
ǫ
d¯2
)
and making n large enough we obtain (22).
Finally, using (18), (19), (20), (21), and (22) in (17) we
obtain
Pr[Edv] ≤ 3ǫ/4 + 2 · 2−nγ (25)
which can be made less than ǫ for n large enough. Thus
Pr[EDe ] → 0 and, when the reference channel is in effect,
Pr[EDr ]→ 0.
B. Converse Part: Necessity
Here we show that if there exists an authentication system
where the pair (De, Dr) is in the achievable distortion region,
then there exists a distribution p(u|s) and functions g(·), f(·, ·)
satisfying (9). In order to apply previously developed tools, it
is convenient to define the rate-function
R∗(De, Dr)
∆
=
sup
p(U|S), f : U× S 7→ X, g : U 7→ S
: E[de(S, f(U, S))] ≤ De, E[dr(S, g(U))] ≤ Dr
I(U ;Y )− I(S;U). (26)
Note that R∗(De, Dr) ≥ 0 if and only if the conditions in (9)
are satisfied. Thus our strategy is to assume that the sequence
of encoding and decoding functions discussed in Section IV
exist with limn→∞ Pr[Esa] = 0, limn→∞ Pr[EDe ] = 0, and—
when the reference channel is in effect—limn→∞ Pr[EDr ] =
0. We then show that these functions imply that R∗(De, Dr) ≥
0 and hence (9) is satisfied.
To begin we note that it suffices to choose g(·) to be the
minimum distortion estimator of S given U . Next, by using
techniques from [19] or by directly applying [36, Lemma 2]
it is possible to prove that allowing X to be non-deterministic
has no advantage, i.e.,
R∗(De, Dr) ≥
sup
p(U|S), p(X|U, S) :
E[de(S,X)] ≤ De, E[dr(S, g(U))] ≤ Dr
I(U ;Y )− I(S;U). (27)
Arguments similar to those in [19] and [36, Lemma 1] show
that R∗(De, Dr) is monotonically non-decreasing and concave
in (De, Dr). These properties will later allow us to make use
of the following lemma, whose proof follows readily from that
of Lemma 4 in [19]:
Lemma 1: For arbitrary random variables
V,A1, A2, . . . , An and a sequence of i.i.d. random variables
S1, S2, . . . , Sn,
n∑
i=1
[
I(V,Ai−11 , S
n
i+1;Ai)− I(V,Ai−11 , Sni+1;Si)
]
≥ I(V ;An)− I(V ;Sn). (28)
As demonstrated by the following Lemma, a suitable Ui is
Ui = (Sˆ
n, Y i−11 , S
n
i+1). (29)
Lemma 2: The choice of Ui in (29) satisfies the Markov
relationship
Yi ↔ (Si, Xi)↔ Ui. (30)
Proof: It suffices to note that
p(yi|xi, si) = p(yi|xi) = p(y
i
1|xn)
p(yi−11 |xn)
=
p(yi1|xn, sn)
p(yi−11 |xn, sn)(31)
=
p(yi1|xn, sˆn, sn)
p(yi−11 |xn, sˆn, sn)
= p(yi|xn, sn, sˆn, yi−11 )
(32)
where the equalities in (31) follow from the memoryless
channel model, and the first equality in (32) follows from the
fact that the system generates authentic reconstructions so (1)
holds. Thus, (32) implies the Markov relationship
Yi ↔ (Xi, Si)↔ (X i1, Xni+1, Si1, Sni+1, Y i−11 , Sˆn), (33)
which by deleting selected terms from the right hand side
yields (30).
Next, we combine these results to prove the converse part
of Theorem 1 except for the cardinality bound on U which is
derived immediately thereafter.
Lemma 3: If a sequence of encoding and decoding func-
tions Υn(·) and Φn (·) exist such that the decoder can gen-
erate authentic reconstructions achieving the distortion pair
(De, Dr) when the reference channel is in effect then
R∗(De, Dr) ≥ 0. (34)
Proof: Define De,i and Dr,i as the component-wise
distortions between Si and Xi and between Si and Sˆi. We
have the following chain of inequalities:
R∗(De, Dr) = R
∗
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
De,i,
1
n
n∑
i=1
Dr,i
)
(35)
≥ 1
n
n∑
i=1
R∗(De,i, Dr,i) (36)
≥ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(Ui;Yi)− I(Ui;Si)] (37)
≥ 1
n
[
I(Sˆn;Y n)− I(Sˆn;Sn)
]
(38)
=
1
n
[
H(Sˆn|Sn)−H(Sˆn|Y n)
]
(39)
≥ − 1
n
H(Sˆn|Y n) (40)
≥ − 1
n
− Pr[Φn (Y n) 6= Sˆn] log |S| . (41)
The concavity of R∗(De, Dr) yields (36). To obtain (37), we
combine Lemma 2 with (27). Next, to obtain (38), let V = Sˆn
and Ai = Yi to apply Lemma 1 with Ui chosen according to
(29). Fano’s inequality yields (41).
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Finally, using (in order) Bayes’ law, (8), and (7), we obtain
Pr[Φn (Y
n) 6= Sˆn] = Pr[Esa]
+ Pr[{Φn (Y n) 6= Sˆn} ∩ {Φn (Y n) = ∅}] (42)
≤ Pr[Esa] + Pr[{Φn (Y n) = ∅}] (43)
≤ Pr[Esa] + Pr[EDr ]. (44)
Therefore exploiting that the system generates an authentic
reconstruction (limn→∞ Pr[Esa] = 0) of the right distortion
(limn→∞ Pr[EDr ] = 0) and that the alphabet of S is finite,
we have that (41) and (44) imply (34).
The following proposition bounds the cardinality of U.
Proposition 1: Any point in the achievable distortion region
defined by (9) can be attained with U distributed over an
alphabet U of cardinality at most (|S| + |X| + 3) · |S| · |X|
with p(x|u, s) singular or over an alphabet U of cardinality at
most |S|+ |X|+ 3 if p(x|u, s) is not required to be singular.
Proof: This can be proved using standard tools from
convex set theory. Essentially, we define a convex set of
continuous functions fj(p) where p represents a distribution
of the form Pr(S = s,X = x|U = u) and the fj(·) functions
capture the features of the distributions relevant to (9). Accord-
ing to Carathe´odory’s Theorem [43, Theorem 14.3.4], [51],
there exist jmax +1 distributions p1 through pjmax +1 such that
any vector of function values, (f1(p′), f2(p′), . . . , fjmax(p′)),
achieved by some distribution p′ can be achieved with a con-
vex combination of the pi distributions. Since each distribution
corresponds to a particular choice for U , at most jmax + 1
possible values are required for U . Specifically, the desired
cardinality bound for our problem can be proved by making
the following syntactical modifications to the argument in [52,
bottom left of p. 634]:
1) Replace Pr(X = x | U = u) with Pr(S = s,X = x |
U = u) which is represented by the notation p.
2) Choose
fj(p) =
∑
x
Pr(S = j,X = x | U = u) (45)
for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} where n = |S|.
3) Choose
fn+1(p) =∑
s
∑
x
de(x, s) Pr(S = s,X = x | U = u). (46)
4) Choose
fn+2(p) =∑
s
∑
x
dr(g(u), s) Pr(S = s,X = x | U = u). (47)
5) Choose
fn+3(p) =
∑
s
[∑
x
Pr(S = s,X = x | U = u)·
log
(∑
x
Pr(S = s,X = x | U = u)
)]
. (48)
6) Let
m(s, u, x, y) =
Pr(Y = y | X = x) Pr(S = s,X = x | U = u)
and choose
fn+4(p) =
∑
y
[(∑
x
∑
s
m(s, u, x, y)
)
·
(∑
x
∑
s
logm(s, u, x, y)
)]
. (49)
7) Choose
fn+5+j(p) =
∑
s
Pr(S = s,X = j | U = u) (50)
for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |X|}.
Since the fj(p) determine Pr[S = s] (and therefore H(S)
as well), De, Dr, H(S|U), H(Y |U), and Pr[X = x] (and
therefore Pr[Y = y] and H(Y ) also), they can be used to
identify all points in the distortion region. According to [52,
Lemma 3], for every point in this region obtained over the
alphabet U there exists a U∗ from alphabet U∗ with cardinality
|U∗| at most one greater than the dimension of the space
spanned by the vectors fi. The fi corresponding to Pr[S = s]
and Pr[X = x] contribute |S|−1 and |X|−1 dimensions while
the other fi contribute four more dimensions. Thus it suffices
to choose |U∗| ≤ |X| + |S| + 3. Note that this cardinality
bound applies to the general case where X is not necessarily
a deterministic function of S and U∗.
By directly applying [36, Lemma 2] to each pair (u∗, s) in
U∗ × S, we can split each u∗ into |X| new symbols u∗∗ such
that the mapping from (u∗∗, s) to x is deterministic. The new
auxiliary random variable U∗∗ takes values over the alphabet
U∗∗ where
|U∗∗| = |U∗| · |S| · |X| = (|X|+ |S|+ 3) · |S| · |X| . (51)
Furthermore, this process does not change the distortion or
violate the mutual information constraint. Thus a deterministic
mapping from the source and auxiliary random variable to the
channel input can be found with no loss of optimality provided
a potentially larger alphabet is allowed for the auxiliary
random variable.
We next apply Theorem 1 to two example scenarios of
interest—one discrete and one continuous.
VI. EXAMPLE: THE BINARY-HAMMING SCENARIO
In some applications of authentication, the content of inter-
est is inherently discrete. For example, we might be interested
in authenticating a passage of text, some of whose characters
may have been altered in a benign manner through errors
in optical character recognition process or error-prone human
transcription during scanning. Or the alterations might be by
the hand of human editor whose job it is to correct, refine,
or otherwise enhance the exposition in preparation for its
publication in a paper, journal, magazine, or book. Or the
alternations may be the result of an attacker deliberately
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tampering with the text for the purpose of distorting its
meaning and affecting how it will be interpreted.
As perhaps the simplest model representative of such dis-
crete problems, we now consider a symmetric binary source
with a binary symmetric reference channel. Specifically, we
model the source as an i.i.d. sequence where each Si is a
Bernoulli(1/2) random variable6 and the reference channel
output is Yi = Xi ⊕Ni, where ⊕ denotes modulo-2 addition
and where Nn is an i.i.d. sequence of Bernoulli(p) random
variables. Finally, we adopt the Hamming distortion measure:
d(a, b) =
{
0, if a = b
1, otherwise .
For this problem, a suitable auxiliary random variable is
U = {S ⊕ (A · T )⊕ [(1−A) · V ]}+ 2 · (1−A), (52)
where A, T , and V are Bernoulli α, τ , and ν random variables,
respectively, and are independent of each other and S and
N . Without loss of generality, the parameters τ and ν are
restricted to the range (0, 1/2). Note that U = {0, 1, 2, 3}.
The encoder function X = f(S,U) is, in turn, given by
X =
{
U, if U ∈ {0, 1}
S, if U ∈ {2, 3}, (53)
from which it is straightforward to verify via (52) that the
encoding distortion is
De = ατ. (54)
The corresponding decoder function Sˆ = g(U) takes the
form
Sˆ = U mod 2, (55)
from which it is straightforward to verify via (52) that the
reconstruction distortion is
Dr = ατ + (1 − α)ν. (56)
In addition, I(U ;S) takes the form
I(U ;S) = H(S)−H(S|U)
= H(S)−H(S,A|U) +H(A|U, S)
= H(S)−H(S|U,A)−H(A|U) +H(A|U, S)
= 1− α · h(τ) − (1− α) · h(ν), (57)
where the second and third equalities follow from the entropy
chain rule, where the last two terms on the third line are
zero because knowing U determines A, and where the last
equality follows from (52), with h(·) denoting the binary
entropy function, i.e., h(q) = −q log q − (1 − q) log(1 − q)
for 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. Similarly, I(U ;Y ) takes the form
I(U ;Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |U)
= H(Y )−H(Y,A|U) +H(A|U, Y )
= H(Y )−H(Y |U,A)−H(A|U) +H(A|U, Y )
(58)
= 1− αh(p)− (1 − α)h (p(1− ν) + (1 − p)ν) .
(59)
6We adopt the convention that all Bernoulli random variables take values
in the set {0, 1}.
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Fig. 4. The solid curve represents the frontier of the achievable distortion
region for a binary symmetric source and a binary symmetric reference
channel with cross-over probability p = 0.2. This plot reflects the system
behavior when the reference channel is in effect. The dashed line represents
the boundary of the larger distortion region achievable when authentication is
not required.
For a fixed p, varying the parameters α, ν, and τ such that
(59) is at least as big as (57) as required by (9a) generates the
achievable distortion region shown in Fig. 4. Note from (59),
(57), (54) and (56) that the boundary point De = Dr = p,
in particular, is obtained by the parameter values α = 1 and
τ = p (with any choice of ν). Numerical optimization over
all p(u|s) and all (not necessarily singular) p(x|s, u) with the
alphabet size |U| = 7 chosen in accordance with Proposition 1
confirms that Fig. 4 captures all achievable distortion pairs.
For comparison, we can also develop the achievable dis-
tortion region when authentication is not required. In this
setting the goal is to provide a representation of the source
which allows a decoder to obtain a good reconstruction from
the reference channel output while keeping the encoding
distortion small. Although in general hybrid analog-digital
coding schemes can be used [36], optimality can also be
achieved without any coding in the binary-Hamming case and
thus all points in the region De ≥ 0 and Dr ≥ p are achievable,
as also shown in Fig. 4. Thus we see that the requirement that
reconstructions be authentic strictly decreases the achievable
distortion region as shown in Fig 4.
VII. EXAMPLE: THE GAUSSIAN-QUADRATIC SCENARIO
In some other applications of authentication, the content
of interest is inherently continuous. Examples involve sources
such as imagery, video, or audio. In addition to tampering
attacks, such content may encounter degradations as a result
of routine handling that includes compression, transcoding,
resampling, printing, and scanning, as well as perturbations
from editing to enhance the content.
As perhaps the simplest model representative of such con-
tinuous problems, we consider a white Gaussian source with a
white Gaussian reference channel. Specifically, we model the
source as an i.i.d. Gaussian sequence where each Si has mean
zero and variance σ2S , and the independent reference channel
noise as an i.i.d. sequence whose ith element Ni has mean
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zero and variance σ2N . Furthermore, we adopt the quadratic
distortion measure d(a, b) = (a− b)2.
While our proofs in Section V exploited that our signals
were drawn from finite alphabets and that all distortion
measures were bounded to simplify our development, the
results can be generalized to continuous-alphabet sources with
unbounded distortion measures using standard methods. In the
sequel, we assume without proof that the coding theorems hold
for Gaussian sources with quadratic distortion. Since it appears
difficult to obtain a closed-form expression for the optimal
distribution for U ,7 we instead develop good inner and outer
bounds on the boundary of the achievable distortion region.
A. Unachievable Distortions: Inner Bounds
To derive an inner bound, we ignore the requirement that
reconstructions be authentic, i.e., satisfy (1), and study the
distortions possible in this case.
For a given constraint on the power P input to the reference
channel, it is well-known that the minimum possible source
reconstruction distortion Dr achievable from the output of
the channel can be achieved without either source or channel
coding in this Gaussian scenario, and the resulting distortion
is
Dr =
σ2Nσ
2
S
σ2N + P
. (60)
Moreover, for a scheme with encoding distortion De, the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality implies that P is bounded accord-
ing to
P = E[X2] = E[(X − S + S)2] = E[(X − S)2] + E[S2]
+ 2E[(X − S)S] ≤ De + σ2S + 2
√
Deσ2S , (61)
where equality holds if and only if X =
(
1 +
√
De/σ2S
)
S.
Thus, substituting (61) into (60) yields the inner bound
Dr =
σ2Nσ
2
S
σ2N +
(√
De + σS
)2 . (62)
B. Achievable Distortions: Outer Bounds
To derive outer bounds we will consider codebooks where
(S,U,X) are jointly Gaussian. Since it is sufficient to consider
X to be a deterministic function of U and S, the innovations
form
T ∼ N(0, σ2T ), E[TS] = 0 (63a)
U = aS + cT (63b)
X = bU + dT (63c)
conveniently captures the desired relationships.8 We examine
two regimes: a low De regime in which we restrict our
attention to the parameterization (a, b, c, d) = (1, 1, 1/α, 1),
and a high De regime in which we restrict our attention to
the parameterization (a, b, c, d) = (1, β, 1, 0). As we will see,
time-sharing between these parameterizations yields almost
the entire achievable distortion region for Gaussian codebooks.
7An analysis using calculus of variations suggests that the optimal distri-
bution is not even Gaussian.
8It can be shown that choosing either a = 1 or c = 1 incurs no loss of
generality.
Low De Regime: We obtain an encoding that is asymptot-
ically good at low De by using a distribution with structure
similar to that used to achieve capacity in the related problem
of information embedding [20]. In the language of [26], the
encoding process involves distortion-compensation. In partic-
ular, the source is amplified by a factor 1/α, quantized to the
nearest codeword, attenuated by α, and then a fraction of the
resulting quantization error is added back to produce the final
encoding, i.e.,
Xn = αQ[Sn/α] + (1− α)(Sn − αQ[Sn/α]) (64)
where Q[·] denotes the quantizer function.
With this encoding structure, it is convenient to make the
assignment Un = αQ[Sn/α], so that we may write
U = S + T/α (65)
X = U + (1 − α)(S − U) = S + T (66)
where T is a Gaussian random variable with mean zero
and variance σ2T independent of both the source S and the
reference channel noise N .
We choose g(·) to be the minimum mean-square estimate
of S given U . Thus the resulting distortions are, via (65) and
(66),
De = E[(X − S)2] = E[(S + T − S)2] = σ2T (67)
and, in turn,
Dr = E[S
2]
(
1− E[SU ]
2
E[S2]E[U2]
)
=
σ2S(σ
2
T + α
2σ2S)− α2σ4S
σ2T + α
2σ2S
=
σ2SDe
De + α2σ2S
. (68)
To show that distortions (67) and (68) are achievable
requires proving that (9a) holds. In [20], the associated dif-
ference of mutual informations is computed (using slightly
different notation) as
I(U ;Y )− I(S;U) =
1
2
log
σ2T (σ
2
T + σ
2
S + σ
2
N )
σ2Tσ
2
S(1− α)2 + σ2N (σ2T + α2σ2S)
(69)
which implies that to keep the difference of mutual informa-
tions nonnegative we need
σ2T (σ
2
T +σ
2
S+σ
2
N ) ≥ σ2Tσ2S(1−α)2+σ2N (σ2T +α2σ2S). (70)
Collecting terms in powers of α yields
α2(σ2Tσ
2
S + σ
2
Nσ
2
S)− 2ασ2Tσ2S − σ4T = (α− r+)(α− r−) ≤ 0
(71)
where
r+ =
1 +
√
1 + σ2T /σ
2
S + σ
2
N/σ
2
S
1 + σ2N/σ
2
T
≥ 0 (72)
r− =
1−
√
1 + σ2T /σ
2
S + σ
2
N/σ
2
S
1 + σ2N/σ
2
T
≤ 0. (73)
Therefore to satisfy the mutual information constraint we need
r− ≤ α ≤ r+.
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To minimize the distortions, (68) and (67) imply we want
|α| as large as possible subject to the constraint (71). Thus we
choose α = r+, from which we see that
αauth
αie
=
(
1 +
√
1 +
σ2T + σ
2
N
σ2S
)
, (74)
where αie = σ2T /(σ2T + σ2N ) is the corresponding information
embedding scaling parameter determined by Costa [20]. Ev-
idently, the scaling parameter for the authentication problem
is at least twice the scaling for information embedding and
significantly larger when either the SNR σ2S/σ2N or signal-to-
(encoding)-distortion ratio (SDR) σ2S/σ2T is small.
High De Regime: An encoder that essentially amplifies the
quantization of the source to overcome the reference channel
noise is asymptotically good at high De. A system with
this structure corresponds to choosing the encoder random
variables according to
U = S + T (75)
X = βU. (76)
In turn, choosing as g(·) the minimum mean-square error
estimator of S given U yields the distortions
De = (1− β)2σ2S + β2σ2T (77)
Dr =
σ2Sσ
2
T
σ2S + σ
2
T
. (78)
It remains only to determine β. Since
I(U ;S) =
1
2
log
σ2S + σ
2
T
σ2T
(79)
and
I(U ;Y ) =
1
2
log
β2(σ2S + σ
2
T ) + σ
2
N
σ2N
, (80)
the mutual information constraint (9a) implies that
β ≥
√
σ2Sσ
2
N
σ2T (σ
2
S + σ
2
T )
. (81)
C. Comparing and Interpreting the Bounds
Using (68) with α given by (72) and varying σ2T yields
one outer bound. Using (77) and (78) with (81) and again
varying σ2T yields the other outer bound. The lower convex
envelope of this pair of outer bounds is depicted in Fig. 5
at different SNRs. To see that the first and second outer
bounds are asymptotically the best achievable for low and high
De, respectively, we superimpose on these figures the best
Gaussian codebook performance, as obtained by numerically
optimizing the parameters in (63).
By using (62), (68), and (78), it is possible to show that
for any fixed De ≥ σ2N the inner and outer bounds converge
asymptotically in SNR in the sense that
lim
SNR→∞
Dr,outer
Dr,inner
= 1
where Dr,inner and Dr,outer represent the inner and outer bounds
corresponding to the fixed value of De. Thus, in this high SNR
regime, Gaussian codebooks are optimal, and (62) accurately
characterizes their performance as reflected in Fig. 5.
The figure also indicates (and it is possible to prove) that
for any fixed SNR, the inner and outer bounds converge
asymptotically in De in the sense that
lim
De→∞
Dr,outer(De)
Dr,inner(De)
= 1
where Dr,inner(De) and Dr,outer(De) represent the inner and
outer bounds as a function of the encoding distortion De.
Evidently in this high encoding distortion regime, Dr/σ2N can
be made arbitrarily small by using Gaussian codebooks and
making De/σ2N sufficiently large. While this implies that, in
principle, there is no fundamental limit to how small we can
make Dr by increasing De through amplification of the source,
in practice secondary effects not included in the model such
as saturation or clipping will provide an effective limit.
Finally, note that the cost of providing authentication is
readily apparent since the inner bound from (62) represents
the distortions achievable when the reconstruction need not
be authentic. Since for a fixed SNR, the bounds converge
asymptotically for large De, and for a fixed De ≥ σ2N the
bounds converge asymptotically for large SNR, we conclude
that the price of authentication is negligible in these regimes.
However, for low De regimes of operation, requiring authen-
ticity strictly reduces the achievable distortion region. This
behavior is analogous to that observed in the binary-Hamming
case.
VIII. COMPARING AUTHENTICATION ARCHITECTURES
The most commonly studied architectures for authentication
are robust watermarking (i.e., self-embedding) and fragile
watermarking. In the sequel we compare these architectures
to that developed in this paper.
A. Authentication Systems Based on Robust Watermarking
The robust watermarking approach to encoding for au-
thentication (see, e.g., [4], [10], [11], [15], [16]) takes the
form of a quantize-and-embed strategy. The basic steps of the
encoding are as follows. First, the source Sn is quantized
to a representation in terms of bits using a source coding
(compression) algorithm. Second the bits are protected us-
ing a cryptographic technique such as a digital signature or
hash function. Finally, the protected bits are embedded into
the original source using an information embedding (digital
watermarking) algorithm. At the decoder, the embedded bits
are extracted. If their authenticity is verified via the appropriate
cryptographic technique, a reconstruction of the source is
produced from the bits. Otherwise, the decoder declares that
an authentic reconstruction is not possible.
It is straightforward to develop the information-theoretic
limits of such approaches, and to compare the results to
the optimum systems developed in the preceding sections. In
particular, if we use optimum source coding and information
embedding in the quantize-and-embed approach, it follows
that, in contrast to Theorem 1, the distortion pair (De, Dr) lies
in the achievable distortion region for a quantize-and-embed
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the text.
structured solution to the problem (2) if and only if there exists
distributions p(sˆ|s) and p(u|s), and a function f(·, ·), such that
I(U ;Y )− I(S;U) ≥ I(S; Sˆ) (82a)
E[de(S, f(U, S))] ≤ De (82b)
E[dr(S, Sˆ)] ≤ Dr. (82c)
These results follow from the characterization of the rate-
distortion function of a source [43] and the capacity of
information embedding systems with distortion constraints as
developed in [36] as an extension of [19].
Comparing (82) to (9) with Sˆ = g(U) we see that
quantize-and-embed systems are unnecessarily constrained,
which translates to a loss of efficiency relative to the optimum
joint source–channel–authentication coding system construc-
tions of Section V. This performance penalty can be quite
severe in the typical regimes of interest, as we now illustrate.
In particular, we quantify this behavior in the two example sce-
narios considered earlier: the binary-Hamming and Gaussian-
quadratic cases.
1) Example: Binary-Hamming Case: In this scenario, the
rate-distortion function is [43]
R(Dr) = 1− h(Dr), (83)
while the information embedding capacity is (see [36]) the
upper concave envelope of the function
gp(De) =
{
0, if 0 ≤ d < p,
h(De)− h(p), if p ≤ De ≤ 1/2,
(84)
i.e.,
C(De) =


gp(Dp)
Dp
De, if 0 ≤ De ≤ Dp,
gp(De), if Dp < De ≤ 1/2,
(85)
where Dp = 1 − 2−h(p). Equating R in (83) to C in (85),
we obtain a relation between Dr and De. This curve is
depicted in Fig. 6 for different reference channel parame-
ters. As this figure reflects, the optimum quantize-and-embed
system performance lies strictly inside the achievable region
for the binary-Hamming scenario developed in Section VI,
with the performance gap largest for the cleanest reference
channels. Moreover, since as we saw in Section III-B clean
reference channels correspond to ensuring small encoding and
reconstruction distortions, this means that quantize-and-embed
systems suffer the largest losses precisely in the regime one
would typically want to operate in.
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2) Example: Gaussian-Quadratic Case: In this scenario,
the rate-distortion function is [43]
R(Dr) =
{
1
2 log
σ2
S
Dr
, 0 ≤ Dr ≤ σ2S
0, Dr > σ
2
S ,
(86)
while the information embedding capacity is [20]
C(De) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
De
σ2N
)
. (87)
Again, equating R in (86) to C in (87), we obtain the following
relation between Dr and De for all De > 0:
Dr =
σ2S
(1 +De/σ2N )
. (88)
This curve is depicted in Fig. 7 for different reference channel
SNRs. This figure reflects that the optimum quantize-and-
embed system performance lies strictly inside the achiev-
able region for the Gaussian-quadratic scenario developed in
Section VII. Likewise, the performance gap is largest for
the highest SNR reference channels. Indeed, comparing the
inner bound (62) on the performance of the optimum system
with that of quantize-and-embed, i.e., (88), we see that while
quantize-and-embed incurs no loss at low SNR:
Dqer
Dr
→ 1 as σ
2
S
σ2N
→ 0, (89)
at high SNR the loss is as much as SNR/2 for De ≥ σ2N :
σ2N
σ2S
Dqer
Dr
→ 1
1 +De/σ2N
≤ 1
2
as
σ2S
σ2N
→∞, (90)
where we have used Dqer to denote the quantize-and-embed
reconstruction distortion (88).
Hence, as in the binary-Hamming case, we see again that
quantize-and-embed systems suffer the largest losses in the
regime where one is most interested in operating — that where
the editor is allowed to make only perturbations small enough
that the corresponding encoding and reconstruction distortions
IEEE TRANS. INFORM. THEORY, VOL. X, NO. XX, 2005 15
−15 −10 −5 0 5
−20
−18
−16
−14
−12
−10
−15 −10 −5 0 5
−12
−10
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
−10 0 10
−10
−5
0
5
10
−10 0 10
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
PSfrag replacements
-10 dB SNR 0 dB SNR
10 dB SNR 30 dB SNR
De/σ
2
N (in dB)De/σ2N (in dB)
De/σ
2
N (in dB)De/σ2N (in dB)
D
r/
σ
2 N
(in
dB
)
D
r/
σ
2 N
(in
dB
)
D
r/
σ
2 N
(in
dB
)
D
r/
σ
2 N
(in
dB
)
Fig. 7. Performance loss of quantize-and-embed systems for the Gaussian-quadratic scenario at various reference channel SNRs. The solid curve depicts the
asymptotic outer bound of the achievable regions for the optimum system; the dashed curve depicts that of the best quantize-and-embed system.
are small.9
B. Authentication Systems Based on Fragile Watermarking
A fundamentally different approach to the authentication
problems of this paper is based on constraining the semantic
severity of the modifications the editor is allowed to make.
In particular, given a distortion measure that captures the
semantic impact of edits to the content, the decoder will
declare the edited content authentic if and only if the distortion
is below some predetermined threshold. We refer to these as
authentication systems based on semantic thresholding.
9It should be emphasized that while one could argue that the quadratic dis-
tortion measure is a poor measure of semantic proximity in many applications,
such reasoning confuses two separate issues. We show here that quantize-
and-embed systems are quite poor when the quadratic measure corresponds
exactly to the semantics of interest. For problems where it is a poor match,
one can expect systems based on more accurate measures to exhibit the
same qualitative behavior — that quantize-and-embed systems will be least
attractive in regimes where the source encodings and reconstructions are
constrained to be semantically close to the original source.
It is important to appreciate that the manner in which the
editor is constrained in systems based on semantic threshold-
ing is qualitatively quite different from the way the editor is
constrained in the systems developed in this paper. In par-
ticular, in our formulation, the editor is contrained according
to a reference channel model that can be freely chosen —
independently of any semantic model.
While in this section we are primarily interested in dis-
cussing the properties of such systems, we first briefly describe
how such systems can be designed. We begin by noting that
role of the encoder in such systems is to mark the original
content so as to enable the eventual decoder to estimate the
distortion between the edited content and that original content,
despite not having direct access to the latter.
One approach to such a problem would be to use the self-
embedding idea discussed in Section VIII-A. In particular, a
compressed version of the original content would be embedded
into that content so that it could be reliably extracted from
the edited content by the decoder and used in the distortion
calculation. In practice, such self-embedding can be somewhat
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resource inefficient, much as it was in the context of Sec-
tion VIII-A. Instead, an approach based on so-called fragile
watermarking is more typically proposed, which allows the
decoder to measure the distortion without explicitly being
given an estimate of the original content. With this approach,
distortion in the known watermark that results from editing
the content are used to infer the severity of distortion in the
content itself.
Typical implementations of the fragile watermarking ap-
proach to encoding for authentication (see, e.g., [5], [7], [13],
[14]) take the following form. A watermark message M known
only to the encoder and decoder (and kept secret from the
editor) is embedded into the source signal by the encoder. The
editor’s processing of the encoded content indirectly perturbs
the watermark. A decoder extracts this perturbed watermark
Mˆ , measures the size of the perturbation (e.g., by computing
the distortion between Mˆ and M with respect to some suitable
measure), then uses the result to assess the (semantic) severity
of the editing the content has undergone. If the severity is
below some predetermined threshold, the decoder declares the
signal to be authentic.
A detailed information-theoretic characterization of authen-
tication systems based on semantic thresholding is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, in the sequel we emphasize some
important qualitative differences in the security characteristics
between such schemes and those developed in this paper.
In particular, as we now develop, there is a fundamental
vulnerability in semantic thresholding schemes that results
from their inherent sensitivity to mismatch in the chosen
semantic model.
To see this, consider a mismatch scenario in which the
authentication system is designed with an incorrect semantic
model (distortion measure). If the system is based on semantic
thresholding, then an attacker who recognizes the mismatch
can exploit this knowledge to make an edit that is semantically
significant, but which the system will deem as semantically
insignificant due to the model error, and thus accept as
authentic. Thus, for such systems, a mismatch can lead to
a security failure.
By contrast, for the authentication systems developed in this
paper, designing the system based on the incorrect semantic
model reduces the efficiency of the system, but does not
impact its security. In particular, use of the incorrect semantic
model leads to encodings and/or authentic reconstructions with
unnecessarily high distortions (with respect to the correct
model). However, attackers cannot exploit this to circumvent
the security mechanism, since they are constrained by the ref-
erence channel, which is independent of the semantic model.
From such arguments, one might conclude that systems
based on semantic thresholding might be preferable so long as
care is taken to develop accurate semantic models. However,
such a viewpoint fails to recognize that in practice some degree
of mismatch is inevitable — the high complexity of accurate
semantic models makes them inherently difficult to learn.
Thus, in a practical sense, authentication systems based on
semantic thresholding are intrinsically less secure than those
developed in this paper.
IX. LAYERED AUTHENTICATION: BROADCAST
REFERENCE CHANNELS
For many applications, one might be interested in an
authentication system with the property that an authentic
reconstruction is always produced, but that its quality degrades
gracefully with the extensiveness of the editing the content has
undergone. In this section we show that discretized versions
of such behavior are possible, and can be built as a natural
extension of the formulation of this paper.
To develop this idea, we begin by observing that the
systems developed thus far in the paper represent a first-
order approximation to such behavior. In particular, for edits
consistent with the reference channel model, an authentic
reconstruction of fixed quality is produced. When the edit-
ing is not consistent with the reference channel, the only
possible authentic reconstruction is the minimal quality one
one obtained from the a priori distribution for the content,
since the edited version must be ignored altogether. In this
section, we show that by creating a hierarchy of reference
channels corresponding to increasing amounts of editing, one
can create multiple authentication reconstructions. In this way,
a graceful degradation characteristic can be obtained to any
desired granularity.
Such systems can be viewed as layered authentication sys-
tems, and arise naturally out of the use of broadcast reference
channel models. With such systems there is a fixed encoding
of the source that incurs some distortion. Then, from edited
content that is consistent with any of the constituent reference
channels in the broadcast model, the decoder produces an
authentic reconstruction of some corresponding fidelity. Oth-
erwise, the decoder declares that an authentic reconstruction
is not possible.
For the purpose of illustration, we focus on the two-user
memoryless degraded broadcast channel [43] as our refer-
ence channel. This corresponds to a two-layer authentication
system. For convenience, we refer to the strong channel
as the “mild-edit” one, and the weak channel, which is a
degraded version of the strong one, as the “harsh-edit” one.
Edits consistent with the mild-edit branch of the reference
channel will allow higher quality authentic reconstructions,
which we will call “fine,” while edits consistent with the harsh-
edit branch will allow lower quality authentic reconstructions,
which we will call “coarse”. For edits inconsistent with either
branch, the only authentic reconstruction will be one that
ignores the edited data, which will be of lowest quality.
In this scenario, for any prescribed level of encoding
distortion De, there is a fundamental trade-off between the
achievable distortions Dfr and Dcr of the corresponding fine
and coarse authentic reconstructions, respectively. Of course
Dcr ≥ Dfr will always be satisfied. However, as we will see,
achieving smaller values of Dcr in general requires accepting
larger values of Dfr and vice-versa. Using the ideas of this
paper, one can explore the fundamental nature of such trade-
offs.
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A. Achievable Distortion Regions
The scenario of interest is depicted in Fig. 8. As a natural
generalization of its definition in the single-layer context (2),
an instance of the layered authentication problem consists of
the eight-tuple
{S, p(s),X,Y, p(yc|yf), p(yf |x), de(·, ·), dr(·, ·)} , (91)
where, since our reference channel is a degraded broadcast
channel, the reference channel law takes the form
p(ync , y
n
f |xn) = p(ync |ynf ) p(ynf |xn). (92)
Let Sˆnc denote the (coarse) authentic reconstruction obtained
when decoder input is consistent with the harsh-edit output of
the reference channel, and let Sˆnf denote the (fine) authen-
tic reconstruction obtained when decoder input is consistent
with the mild-edit output of the reference channel. In turn,
the corresponding two reconstruction distortions are defined
according to
Dcr =
1
n
n∑
i=1
dr(S
n, Sˆnc ) (93a)
Dfr =
1
n
n∑
i=1
dr(S
n, Sˆnf ). (93b)
The following theorem develops trade-offs between the
encoding distortion De, and the two reconstruction distortions
(93) that are achievable.
Theorem 2: The distortion triple (De, Dcr , Dfr) lies in
the achievable distortion region for the layered authentica-
tion problem (91) if there exist distributions p(u, t|s) and
p(x|u, t, s), and functions gc (·) and gf (·, ·) such that
I(U ;Yc)− I(S;U) ≥ 0 (94a)
I(T ;Yf |U)− I(S;T |U) ≥ 0 (94b)
E[de(S,X)] ≤ De (94c)
E[dr(S, gc (U))] ≤ Dcr . (94d)
E[dr(S, gf (U, T ))] ≤ Dfr. (94e)
In this theorem, the achievable distortion region is defined in
a manner that is the natural generalization of that for single-
layer systems as given in Definition 2.
In the interests of brevity and since it closely parallels that
for the single-layer case, we avoid a formal derivation of this
result. Instead, we sketch the key ideas of the construction.
We also leave determining the degree to which the distortion
region can be further extended via more elaborate coding for
future work.
Proof: [Sketch of Proof:]
First a codebook Cc is created for the harsh-edit layer at
rate Rc = I(U ;S) + 2γ where only 2n(Rc+γ) codewords
are marked as admissible as in Theorem 1. Then for each
codeword cc ∈ Cc an additional random codebook Cf(cc) of
rate Rf = I(T ;S|U)+2γ is created according to the marginal
distribution p(t|u) where only 2n(Rf+γ) codewords are marked
as admissible.
The encoder first searches Cc for an admissible codeword
cc jointly typical with the source and then searches Cf(cc) for
a refinement cf that is jointly typical with the source. The
pair (cc, cf) is then mapped into the channel according to
p(x|u, t, s). By standard arguments the encoding will succeed
with high probability provided that Rc > I(U ;S) and Rf >
I(T ;S|U).
When the channel output is consistent with either output
of the reference channel, the decoder locates an admissible
codeword cˆc ∈ Cc jointly typical with the signal. If the
signal is consistent with the harsh-edit output of the reference
channel, in particular, the decoder then produces the coarse
authentic reconstruction Sˆnc = gc (cˆc). However, if the signal
is consistent with the mild-edit output of the reference channel,
the decoder then proceeds to locate an admissible cˆf ∈ Cf(cˆc)
and produces the fine authentic reconstruction Sˆnf = gf (cˆc, cˆf).
By arguments similar to those used in the single-layer case
(i.e., proof of Theorem 1), this strategy achieves vanishingly
small probabilities of successful attack, and when the reference
channel is in effect meets the distortion targets provided that
Rc < I(U ;Yc) and Rf < I(T ;Yf |U).
B. Example: Gaussian-Quadratic Case
The Gaussian-quadratic case corresponds to the mild- and
harsh-edit outputs of the reference channel taking the forms
Yf = X +N and Yc = Yf + V , respectively, where N and V
are Gaussian random variables independent of each other, as
well as S and X .
For this case, a natural approach to the layered authen-
tication system design has the structure depicted in Fig. 9,
which generalizes that of the single-layer systems developed
in Section VII. The encoder determines the codeword T n
nearest the source Sn, then perturbs T n so as to reduce
the encoding distortion, producing the encoding Xn. If the
channel output stays within the darkly shaded sphere centered
about T n, e.g., producing Y nf as shown, the decoder produces
a fine-grain authentic reconstruction from T n. If the channel
output is outside the darkly shaded sphere, but inside the
encompassing lightly shaded sphere centered about Un, e.g.,
producing Y nc as shown, the decoder produces a coarse-grain
authentic reconstruction from Un. If the channel output is
outside any shaded region, e.g., producing Zn, the decoder
indicates that an authentic reconstruction is not possible.
An achievable distortion region for this layered authentica-
tion scenario is obtained from Theorem 2 with the auxiliary
random variables chosen according to
U = S +A/α (95)
T = S +B/β (96)
X = S +A+B. (97)
where A and B are Gaussian random variables independent
of S. Choosing gc (·) and gf (·, ·) to be the minimum mean-
square error estimates of S from U and (U, T ), respectively,
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Fig. 8. Two-layer authentication system operation when the reference channel is in effect. From the outputs Yf and Yc of the degraded broadcast reference
channel, corresponding to mild and harsh editing, the respective fine and coarse authentic reconstructions Sˆn
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Fig. 9. Illustration of the nested codebook geometry associated with a two-layer authentication system for the Gaussian-quadratic scenario. The centers of
large and small shaded spheres correspond to admissible coarse and fine authentic reconstructions, respectively.
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yields
De = σ
2
A + σ
2
B (98)
Dcr = σ
2
S
(
1− E[SU ]
2
E[S2]E[U2]
)
=
σ2Sσ
2
A
σ2A + α
2σ2S
(99)
Dfr = σ
2
S − ΛS,[UT ]Λ−1[UT ]Λ[UT ],S
=
σ2Sσ
2
Aσ
2
B
β2σ2Sσ
2
A + σ
2
Aσ
2
B + α
2σ2Sσ
2
B
, (100)
where Λ with a single subscript denotes the covariance of
its argument, and Λ with a subscript pair denotes the cross-
covariance between its arguments.
To produce Sˆnc , a decoder essentially views B as additive
channel noise. Therefore, we can immediately apply the argu-
ments from Section VII-B to obtain
I(U ;Yc)− I(S;U) =
1
2
log
σ2A(σ
2
A + σ
2
S + σ
2
N + σ
2
V + σ
2
B)
σ2Aσ
2
S(1− α)2 + (σ2N + σ2V + σ2B)(σ2A + α2σ2S)
.
(101)
From this we can solve for α as in the single-layer case of
Section VII-B by simply replacing σ2T and σ2N with σ2A and
σ2N + σ
2
V + σ
2
B , respectively, in (72).
Finally, since
I(S;T |U)− I(T ;Yf |U) = H(T |U, Yf)−H(T |U, S)
= H(T, U, Yf)−H(U, Yf)
−H(T, U, S) +H(U, S). (102)
we see that (94b) implies
det(Λ[TUYf ])
det(Λ[UYf ])
≤ det(Λ[TUS])
det(Λ[US])
. (103)
By varying σ2A, σ2B , and β such that (103) is satisfied we
can trace out the volume of an achievable distortion region.
Fig. 10 shows slices of this three dimensional region by
plotting the fine and coarse reconstruction distortions Dfr and
Dcr for various values of the encoding distortion De. Note
that it follows from our single-layer inner bounds that for a
particular choice of encoding distortion De, the achievable
trade-offs between Dcr and Dfr are contained within the region
Dcr ≥
σ2S(σ
2
N + σ
2
V )
σ2N + σ
2
V +
(√
De + σS
)2 (104)
Dfr ≥
σ2Sσ
2
N
σ2N +
(√
De + σS
)2 , (105)
where obviously the lower bound of (105) is smaller than that
of (104).
A simple alternative to the layering system for such au-
thentication problems is time-sharing, whereby some fraction
of time the encoder uses a codebook appropriate for the
harsh-edit reference channel, and for the remaining time uses
a codebook appropriate for the mild-edit reference channel.
When the harsh-edit reference channel is in effect, the decoder
produces the coarse authentic reconstruction for the fraction of
time the corresponding codebook is in effect and produces zero
the rest of the time. When the mild-edit reference channel is in
effect, the decoder produces the fine authentic reconstruction
during the fraction of time the corresponding codebook is
in effect, and produces the coarse reconstruction for the
remaining time (since the broadcast channel is a degraded
one). However, as Fig. 10 also illustrates, this approach is in
general quite inefficient: the use of such time-sharing results
in a substantially smaller achievable region.
X. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper develops one meaningful formulation for au-
thentication problems in which the content may undergo a
variety of types of legitimate editing prior to authentication.
As part of this formulation, we adopt a particular formal
notion of security in such settings. For such a formulation, and
with the simplest classes of models, we establish that secure
authentication systems can be constructed, and subsquently
analyze their fundamental performance limits. From these
models, we further develop how such systems offer significant
advantages over other proposed solutions.
Many opportunities for further research remain. For exam-
ple, extensions of the main results to richer content, semantic,
and edit models may provide additional insights into the
behavior of such sysems. It would also be useful to understand
the degree to which robust and/or universal solutions exist for
the problem; such approaches seek to avoid requiring accurate
prior model knowledge during system design.
There are additional opportunities to further refine the anal-
ysis even for the existing models. For example, characterizing
the manner in which asymptotic limits are approached —
for example via error exponents — would provide useful
engineering insights. Likewise, further analyzing public-key
formulations, in which edits are more generally subject to
computational constraints, could also be revealing. From this
persective, the Appendix represents but a starting point.
More generally, identifying and relating other meaningful
notions of security for such problems would be particularly
useful in putting the results of this paper in perspective. For
example, a broader unifying framework for characterizing
and comparing different notions of security could provide a
mechanism for selecting a formulation best matched to the
social needs and/or engineering constraints at hand.
Finally, there are many interesting questions about how
to best approach the development of practical authentication
systems based on these ideas. These include questions of cus-
tomized code design and implementation, but also architectural
issues concerning the degree to these systems can be built
from interconnections of existing and often standardized com-
ponents — i.e., existing compression systems, error-control
codes, and public-key cryptographic tools.
APPENDIX
A PUBLIC-KEY ADAPTATION OF THE PRIVATE-KEY
AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM MODEL
To simplify the analysis we have focussed on private key
systems where the encoder and decoder share a secret key θ,
which is kept hidden from editors. In most practical applica-
tions, however, it is more convenient to use public key systems
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where a public key θp is known to all parties (including
editors) while a signing key, θs, is known only to the encoder.
The advantage of public key systems is that while only the
encoder possessing θs can encode, anyone possessing θp can
decode and verify a properly encoded signal. In this section,
we briefly describe how a secret key authentication system
can be combined with a generic digital signature scheme to
yield a public key system. Some additional aspects of such an
implementation are discussed in, e.g., [49], [50].
A digital signature scheme consists of a signing function
τ = S(m, θs) and verifying function V(m, τ, θp). Specifically,
the signing function maps an arbitrary length message m
to a γ bit tag τ using the signing key θs. The verifying
function returns true (with high probability) when given a
message, public key, and tag generated using the signing
function with the corresponding signing key. Furthermore, it
is computationally infeasible to produce a tag accepted by
the verifier without using the signing key. Many such digital
signature schemes have been described in the cryptography
literature where τ requires a number of bits that is sub-linear
in n or even finite.
Modified Encoder:
1) The public key of the digital signature scheme is pub-
lished, and there is no secret key (equivalently, the secret
key in the our original formulation is simply published).
2) The encoder uses the original authentication system to
map the source Sn to X˜n = Υn(Sn).
3) For a system like the one described in Section V-A, there
are a finite number of possible values for the authentic
reconstruction Sˆn and the authentic reconstruction is a
deterministic function of Sn. Thus each reconstruction
can be assigned a bitwise representation c(Sˆn), from
which the encoder computes the digital signature tag
τ = S(c(Sˆn), θs) using the digital signature algorithm.
4) Finally the signature τ is embedded into X˜n, produc-
ing Xn, using an information embedding (data hiding)
algorithm. The chosen algorithm can be quite crude
since τ only requires a sub-linear number of bits. The
algorithm parameters are chosen to that the embedding
incurs asymptotically negligible additional distortion to
the overall encoding process.
Modified Decoder:
1) The decoder extracts from Y n an estimate τˆ of the
embedded signature τ . Since the size of τ is sub-linear,
the embedding algorithm parameters can be further
chosen so that τˆ = τ with arbitrarily high probability
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when the reference channel is in effect.
2) Next, the decoder uses the original authentication system
to produce S˜n = Φn (Y n), and then, in turn, its bitwise
representation c(S˜n).
3) The decoder checks whether the digital signature veri-
fying algorithm V(c(S˜n), τˆ , θp) accepts the S˜n as valid.
4) If so, then the decoder produces the authentic recon-
struction Sˆn = S˜n. Otherwise, the decoder produces
the special symbol ∅, declaring that it is unable to
authenticate.
With this construction, we see that the security of such a
system is determined by the security of the underlying public-
key digital signature scheme used. Specifically, the only way
an attacker can defeat the system is to find a matching Sˆn
and τ accepted by the digital signature verifying algorithm.
All other performance aspects of the system are effectively
unchanged.
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